Judicial Perspective and Mentorship at the Supreme Court: A Review Essay on \u3cem\u3eIn Chambers: Stories of Supreme Court Law Clerks and Their Justices\u3c/em\u3e, Edited by Todd C. Peppers and Artemus Ward by Gee, Harvey
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 51 Number 1 Article 11 
2012 
Judicial Perspective and Mentorship at the Supreme Court: A 
Review Essay on In Chambers: Stories of Supreme Court Law 
Clerks and Their Justices, Edited by Todd C. Peppers and Artemus 
Ward 
Harvey Gee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Judges Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harvey Gee, Judicial Perspective and Mentorship at the Supreme Court: A Review Essay on In Chambers: 
Stories of Supreme Court Law Clerks and Their Justices, Edited by Todd C. Peppers and Artemus Ward, 
51 Duq. L. Rev. 217 (2012). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol51/iss1/11 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Duquesne Scholarship 
Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne 
Scholarship Collection. 
Judicial Perspective and Mentorship at the
Supreme Court: A Review Essay on In Chambers:
Stories of Supreme Court Law Clerks and Their
Justices, Edited by Todd C. Peppers and Artemus
Ward
Harvey Gee*
I. INTRODUCTION ....................... ........... 217
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE MENTORSHIP RELATIONSHIP ..... 219
III. THE FIRST FEMALE LAW CLERK
AND THE FIRST AFRICAN AMERICAN LAw CLERK......... 225
IV. THE MODERN SUPREME COURT CLERKSHIP ................ 231
V. THE INCREASE OF ASIAN AMERICAN
JURISTS ON THE FEDERAL BENCH
AND THE POSSIBLE NOMINATION OF AN ASIAN
AMERICAN TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ..... ...... 238
VI. CONCLUSION ............................... ..... 248
I. INTRODUCTION
In their recently released book, In Chambers: Stories of Su-
preme Court Law Clerks and Their Justices ("In Chambers"),' edi-
tors Todd Peppers and Artemus Ward offer a collection of previ-
ously published articles and new unpublished essays on select jus-
tices and their clerks to illuminate how the personal relationships
between justices and clerks impact the Court. Contributors in-
clude distinguished law professors, judges, academics, and legal
correspondents. Peppers and Ward are certainly qualified to talk
about the Supreme Court clerkship institution. Six years ago,
Peppers released Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and
* Attorney, Federal Defenders of the Middle District of Georgia, Inc.; United States
Supreme Court Fellows Program Finalist, 2012. The views expressed herein are not neces-
sarily attributed to any past, present, or future employers. I thank the editors for their
hard work and assistance.
1. IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES (Todd
C. Peppers & Artemus Ward eds., 2012) [hereinafter IN CHAMBERS] (University of Virginia
Press 2012, PP. 445, $ 34.95. ISBN: 978-081393265-1).
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Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerk' and Ward, along with
David L. Weiden, wrote Sorcerers' Apprentices: 100 Years of Law
Clerks at the United States Supreme Court.. These books, based
on archival papers, interviews and surveys with former clerks,
offered behind-the scenes looks at the institutional development of
the law clerk institution and how it evolved since its nineteenth-
century beginnings. Now, the authors assemble a collection of
first-hand accounts of the inter-workings of the justices' chambers
from the perspective of former law clerks, and cover the origins of
the clerkship institution, the pre-modern clerkship institution,
and the modern clerkship institution.
Generally, a judicial clerkship, a prestigious way to begin a legal
career, offers new law school graduates an opportunity to work
closely with a judge for a one or two-year term, gain unparalleled
insight into the judicial process, and get broad exposure to various
areas of law. The clerk works closely with the judge to handle the
judge's docket by conducting legal research and assisting in the
drafting of opinions and bench memoranda. A clerk generally acts
as the judge's confidant and as a liaison between the judge and the
lawyers and litigants. In the process, clerks observe activities in
the courtroom and in chambers, see examples of good and bad
lawyering, develop research and writing skills, and learn the nuts
and bolts of litigation or the appellate process. The judge's name
is listed on an attorney's r~sum6 for life, the affiliation helps to
build professional contacts, and judges often serve as mentors to
former clerks throughout their careers.
At the top of the hierarchy is the United States Supreme Court
clerkship. There has always been great public interest, if not fas-
cination, with Supreme Court clerkships. For recent law school
graduates, such a clerkship on the high court is an opportunity of
a lifetime because these highly coveted and sought after clerkships
offer keys to the doors of power. Clerk alumni regularly move on
to serve as law professors in top law schools, serve on Presidential
cabinets, and become partners at major law firms or CEOs of For-
tune 500 companies. Large law firms collect former Supreme
Court clerks like trophies, and offer them handsome signing bo-
2. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE
OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006).
3. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS' APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW
CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006).
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nuses upwards of $250,000.4 Almost all law clerks are hired pri-
marily on the basis of academic achievement, and are almost al-
ways alumni of top-tier law schools, as well as having clerked with
a United States Court of Appeals judge who is a personal friend,
or sometimes former clerk, of the Supreme Court Justices to which
the applicant is applying.' Increasingly, clerkship committees at
law schools also push select applicants.' The number of applicants
exploded during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, and the Court
Justices typically receive more than a thousand applications an-
nually for just a handful of spots in each chamber.' Now, the Rob-
erts Court probably receives even more applications in this ailing
economy.
This review essay is divided into four parts. First, it explains
the origins of the mentorship relationships between justices and
their clerks, and explores the process in which the justices and
clerks rely on personal experiences as reference points in inter-
preting issues and making decisions. The information provided in
In Chambers reveals that the identity of a judge and clerk informs
his or her interpretation of cases. Next, the essay discusses the
first female and African American law clerk at the Supreme
Court, and shows how the reliance on personal experience carries
special significance when considering gender and race issues.
Then it describes the modern Supreme Court clerkship. Finally,
the essay focuses on the noticeable lack of Asian Americans on the
federal bench, especially on the Court and explains why this has
created barriers to justice for Asian Americans. This part also
addresses the potential impact of having more Asian Americans
on the federal judiciary, and the possibility of an Asian American
Justice being nominated to the Supreme Court.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE MENTORSHIP RELATIONSHIP
Chief Justice Horace Gray was the first U.S. Supreme Court
Justice to hire a recent law school graduate as his law clerk in the
summer of 1875.8 Chief Justice Gray was well known for his apti-
4. See Tony Mauro, Lower Hiring Bonuses Expected for Supreme Court Clerks,
LAW.COM, (June 15, 2009),
http://www.lawjobs.comlnewsandviews/LawArticle.jsp?id=1202431469615&slreturn=20130
007095748.
5. Clare Cushman, Foreword to IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at ix, x.
6. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3, at 58.
7. Id.
8. Cushman, supra note 5, at ix.
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tude for legal research and demanded as much from his assis-
tants.? Chief Justice Gray initially began hiring Harvard Law
School graduates to be his legal secretaries and to handle the in-
creased workload of the Chief Justice position.o Justice Gray per-
sonally paid the salaries of Thomas Russell, William Schofield,
and Henry Eldridge Warner, who were the first Supreme Court
law clerks." Moving forward in time, Scott Messinger explains
that Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. was a key figure in transforming
the nature of law clerking from an administrative institution to an
experience that awakens a young lawyer's intellectual curiosities,
giving him or her important societal responsibilities.1 2 This trans-
formation evolved into the Justice Louis Brandies clerkship model,
which has become the precursor for the modern clerkship institu-
tion: the Supreme Court law clerk would have graduated from a
top law school, possess a strong work ethic, and possess superior
legal writing and research skills.' 3 From the 1950s through the
1960s, the law clerk transformed into a full-fledged attorney or
law firm associate involved in all aspects of chamber work. 14
Each justice displayed a distinctive approach to tackling the
chambers workload and in deciding how much writing the clerk
would do. Here, the memoirs are valuable to understanding the
judicial thought processes and administrative style. of individual
justices. Andrew Kaufman writes about Justice Benjamin
Cardozo's practice of relegating pre-argument work as the clerk's
major responsibility, while retaining opinion writing for himself. 5
Cardozo was as productive as he was efficient, and he often wrote
his opinions on a legal pad while pacing.'" Kaufman explains that
he would have a draft on Sunday, and his secretary would type up
the draft the next day." But Cardozo was a private person, and
he never seemingly had a close relationship with his clerks." Less
9. Todd C. Peppers, Birth of an Institution: Horace Gray and the Lost Law Clerks, in
IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at 17, 20.
10. .Id. at 19.
11. Id. at 17.
12. I. Scott Messinger, The Judge as Mentor: Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and His Law
Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at 42, 42-43.
13. Todd C. Peppers, Isaiah and His Young Disciples: Justice Brandeis and His Law
Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at 67, 82.
14. PEPPERS, supra note 2, at 145.
15. See Andrew L. Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo and His Law Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS:
STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES, supra note 1, at 88, 92.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 94.
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private was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. who mentored his
law clerks and utilized these relationships in an effort to enhance
his judicial reputation and to inspire other state and federal judg-
es to do the same."
Todd Peppers and Beth Driver write that Justice Felix Frank-
furter, with his serious demeanor, considered the law clerks to be
his junior partners.2 0 Frankfurter believed that it was not a good
use of time to have clerks reviewing certiorari petitions and in-
stead, he wanted his clerks to draft opinions.21 With these writing
tasks, Frankfurter would tell the law clerks what the case was
about, his position, and what he wanted.2 2 The clerk would then
draft the opinion subject to Frankfurter's review and feedback be-
fore it went to print.23 On the other hand, Justice Hugo Black opt-
ed to spend his evenings at home and insisted on doing his own
work, writing his own opinions, conducting his own legal research,
making his own decisions on petitions for certiorari, reading the
entire record, and preparing for hearing cases on the bench and
for conference. 24 According to Daniel Meador, who clerked for
Black, his boss was a jurist who saw his role as defender of the
Constitution and protector of the individual. He remembers the
Justice's unique personality and distinct interest in books and
particular legal views, which he freely shared with his clerks.25
Interestingly, two thirds of Black's fifty-five clerks (mostly Har-
vard and Yale graduates) during his thirty-four years on the court
(1947-1971) were from the South and many were from his home
state of Alabama.2 6 As for style, Meador relays that Justice Black
disliked Latinisms, legal jargon, and abstract legal concepts and
was insistent on clarity and brevity in his writing. 7
Certainly, clerks witnessed the judicial philosophy of their Jus-
tice as applied to significant cases first-hand. Justice Wiley
Blount Rutledge, Jr., one of the strongest proponents of civil liber-
ties and civil rights in the Court's history, with Justice Frank
19. See Messinger, supra note 12, at 43.
20. See Todd C. Peppers & Beth See Driver, Half Clerk, Half Son: Justice Felix Frank-
furter and His Law Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at 141, 146.
21. Id. at 147.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Charles A. Reich, A Passion for Justice: Living with and Clerking for Justice Hugo
Black, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, 111, 112.
25. Id. at 115.
26. See Daniel J. Meador, Clerking for Justice Hugo Black, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note
1, at 125, 126.
27. Id. at 133.
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Murphy, took more expansive views of individual rights than
those of two other liberals on the Court in the 1940s.2 8 Judge John
M. Ferren writes about Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge, Jr., who
was one of the Court's strongest proponents of civil liberties and
civil rights. 29 Interestingly, both Justices were on the Court dur-
ing World War II and heard the Japanese American internment
cases. Judge Ferren writes, "During Rutledge's first full term, his
impulse for civil liberties applied to the curfew imposed on West
Coast Japanese Nationals and Japanese Americans and in the
next term, to the evacuation program that resulted in their in-
ternment."3 0 The internment of 120,000 Japanese Americans dur-
ing World War II is considered one of the twentieth century's most
prominent mass trampling of civil liberties.31 It has been widely
condemned as racist governmental and judicial conduct toward
the Japanese and Japanese Americans.3 2 During a time of war,
Rutledge, despite his strong philosophical convictions, deferred to
the military's argument that it was necessary for national securi-
ty, despite his law clerk's suggestion that he might gain
knowledge and insight in receiving the FBI analysis and contem-
28. See John M. Ferren, Wiley Blount Rutledge Jr. and His Law Clerks, in IN
CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES, supra note 1, at
231, 231.
29. Id. Justices are heralded by their clerks as exemplars of judicial ethics, craftsman-
ship decision-making and lifelong career advisers. For example, Rutledge was an exemplar
of high personal integrity to his law clerks and maintained a serious business relationship
with his clerks while establishing an intellectual partnership with them. See id. at 239.
This relationship was instilled in Justice John Paul Stevens when he clerked for Rutledge,
and there was definitely a lasting influence. Like Rutledge, Stevens chose to express his
divergent opinions from the majority in frequent dissents and concurrences. See Laura
Krugman Ray, Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul Stevens and Wiley B.
Rutledge, 41 CONN. L. REV. 211, 211 (2008). Echoes of Rutledge's concern for individual
justice also reverberated in Stevens' writing for the majority opinion in Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004), superseded by statute, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
148, 119 Stat. 2739. In Rasul, the Court addressed whether the six hundred detainees at
the American naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba could challenge the legality of their
detention in U.S. courts on the basis that none were enemy combatants or terrorists. See
also Joseph T. Thai, The Law Clerk Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush- John Paul Stevens' Influence
from World War II to the War on Terror, 92 VA. L. REV. 501, 526-28 (2006) (explaining that
the Rasul opinion, cognizant of the Japanese American internment cases, emphasized the
importance of striking a proper balance between the grave harms done to an individual's
civil liberties and the dangers to the nation's security and the decision required the gov-
ernment to provide procedures guaranteeing citizen detainees due process of our laws).
30. Ferren, supra note 28, at 236.
31. See ERIC K YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL L. IZUMI, JERRY KANG & FRANK
H. Wu, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT, at
xxiii (2001).
32. Id.
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plating the issue further.3 3 Justice Murphy, in his famous dissent
in Korematsu v. United States,3 4 in which the Court upheld a
World War II government exclusion order calling for the evacua-
tion and internment of Japanese Americans,3 ' rejected the majori-
ty's reliance on the government's unsubstantiated finding that
Japanese Americans posed a real danger of espionage as he fa-
mously wrote:
This exclusion of "all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien
and non-alien," from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of mili-
tary necessity in the absence of martial law ought not to be
approved. Such exclusion goes over "the very brink of consti-
tutional power" and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.
Though not discussed in the book, it is worthwhile to recall the
empathy that Rutledge and Murphy felt about the racism that
Japanese Americans experienced. This was again highlighted in
their concurrences in the important case Oyama v. California,3 7
which involved the right of Japanese Americans to own property
and defend their property rights against land seizure proceedings.
Though the California Supreme Court upheld alien land laws as
constitutional,3 8 these same laws were later struck down by the
Court in Oyama." In an opinion by Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson,
the Supreme Court in Oyama invalidated an alien land statute as
applied, ruling that its implementation violated the constitutional
right of Fred Oyama, a Japanese American, to the equal protec-
tion of the laws.4 0 Oyama involved an application of the California
Alien Land Law in the mid-1940s, which prohibited aliens ineligi-
ble for American citizenship from acquiring, owning, occupying,
leasing, or transferring agricultural land.41 Under the law, any
property acquired in violation of the statute would escheat as of
the date of acquisition.4 2 The same result followed any transfer
33. Ferren, supra note 28, at 236. But see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY
EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 186 (2005) (characterizing the
Court's decisions as "cowardly and deplorable capitulations to intrusions on liberty that
had no justification in national security concerns.").
34. 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 219.
36. Id. at 233.
37. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
38. People v. Oyama, 173 P.2d 794 (Cal. 1946).
39. Oyama, 332 U.S. 633.
40. Id. at 640.




made with the intent to evade or avoid escheat.4 3 Chief Justice
Vinson, in the majority opinion, declared that "[t]he cumulative
effect [of the Act], we believe, was clearly to discriminate against
Fred Oyama solely ... [on the] basis ... that his father was Japa-
nese and not American, Russian, Chinese, or English."4 The Court
was not persuaded by the state's argument that it was not race-
based law but rather, a race-neutral law in both substance and
application.4 5 In sharp contrast to the majority opinion, Justices
Murphy and Rutledge, in their concurrences, examined the legis-
lative history of the passage of the Alien Land Law, revealing the
anti-Japanese animus that motivated its passage and also provid-
ing a summary of the history of anti-Japanese sentiment in this
country.46 Justice Murphy, in powerful dicta, discussed the vir-
tues of the Japanese farmers in California and their contributions
to the farming industry, as well as their overall earnest efforts to
assimilate into this country.47 The concurrence also discussed the
great racial bigotry that Japanese Americans endured during
World War II, and the pervasive images that "relate to the alleged
disloyalty, clannishness, inability to assimilate, racial inferiority
and racial undesirability of the Japanese, whether citizens or al-
iens. "48
Next, the practical knowledge and hands-on experience gained
by clerks during the term through the back and forth process of
drafting opinions and getting critiques from their co-clerks and
the Justice created bonds between Justices and clerks that were
indelibly fermented in and out of chambers. For example, Black
and his clerks would eat lunch together in the public cafeteria on
the ground floor of the Supreme Court Building, and the Justice
often displayed his sense of humor while telling tales from his
practice, senatorial campaign, and service." Some Justices invit-
ed clerks to their homes, treating the clerks as a part of their ex-
tended families. There were also many chances to maintain the
Justice-clerk relationship after the clerkship term through reun-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 644.
45. Id. at 644-45.
46. Id. at 671 (Murphy, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 670.
48. Id. at 671.
49. See Meador, supra note 26, at 136-37.
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ions." Many of the former Justices held lifelong relationships
with their clerks.
The discussions of the intimate confines of judicial chambers of-
ten showcased the personalities of some of the Justices and their
work habits. Some Justices expressed their quirky personalities.
Bruce Allen Murphy analyzes the tumultuous relationship be-
tween Justice William 0. Douglas and his clerks. In his contribu-
tion entitled, "Fifty-Two Weeks of Boot Camp," Murphy describes
how Douglas expected his staff to work hard and explains why he
earned the reputation of being one of the most demanding Justices
on the Court.5 2 Douglas often would yell and scold his law clerks."
"Everyone in the office feared Douglas's predictability and wrath
over missteps, both real and perceived."54 In his defense, Douglas
was a hard worker and expected the same or more from his
clerks." Nonetheless, clerks were so scared to leave before the
Justice, who worked around the clock, that they would wait until
Douglas left for the day before leaving.56 Interestingly, it was
Douglas who could be regarded as a pioneer in increasing diversity
among clerks at the Court.5
III. THE FIRST FEMALE LAW CLERK AND THE FIRST AFRICAN
AMERICAN LAW CLERK
Given the contemporary discussions about diversity in the
workplace and on university campuses and having the first Afri-
can American President in the White House about to begin his
second term, In Chambers includes a timely discussion of gender
and racial diversity (or the lack thereof) at the Court. A look at
the Court's history tracks the slow change. Lucile Lomen was the
first female Supreme Court law clerk." She started clerking for
Douglas in September 1944 amidst a great deal of press cover-
age.5 ' Lomen was taught to be self-reliant as a child growing up
50. Cushman, supra note 5, at xi.
51. See, e.g., Peppers & Driver, supra note 20, at 154.
52. See Bruce Allen Murphy, Fifty-Two Weeks of Boot Camp, in IN CHAMBERS, supra
note 1, at 179, 180.
53. Id. at 181.
54. Id. at 182.
55. Id. at 184.
56. Id. at 186.
57. Id. at 184.
58. Jennie Berry Chandra, Lucile Lomen: The First Female United States Supreme




in Nome, Alaska under the shadow of her grandfather, Gudbrand
J. Lomen, who served as a federal judge from 1921 until 1932.0
Lomen graduated from Whitman College and the University of
Washington Law School." During law school, even while shoul-
dering a heavy course load, Lomen worked thirty hours per week
as a secretary for University of Washington Law School Dean
Judson F. Falknor. Lomen was vice president of The Washington
Law Review, where she authored two law review articles that re-
ceived critical acclaim and were ahead of the legal scholarship of
her time.6 2 While Lomen clerked, the role of Supreme Court law
clerks expanded, and clerks made substantive contributions in
decisions."
Lomen did just this in Ex Parte Endo,64 "[olne of the most signif-
icant political and civil rights cases" of the time, which involved a
challenge to Japanese internment camps.s Mitsuye Endo's chal-
lenge arose from a habeas corpus petition." Mitsuye Endo, an
American citizen of Japanese ancestry, was initially removed to
the Tule Lake War Relocation Center in California and later
transferred to the Central Utah Relocation Center." Endo alleged
that she was a loyal and law-abiding American citizen and, as
such, was being held unlawfully and against her will because no
formal charges were brought against her." The majority opinion
focused on a series of 108 Civilian Exclusion Orders issued by
General DeWitt." The Court in Endo also spent considerable time
discussing the establishment of the War Relocation Authority.70
Agreeing with Justice Douglas's strong critique of the Department
of Justice's rationale for its process, the Court ruled that Endo
was entitled to relief.n
Significantly, Endo was devoid of any discussion of the persis-
tent underlying constitutional issue: whether it was constitution-
al to intern Japanese-Americans based on race.7 2 The ruling was
60. Id. at 200.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 202-04.
63. See id. 207-08.
64. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
65. Chandra, supra note 58, at 207.
66. Endo, 323 U.S. at 285.
67. Id. at 284-85.
68. Id. at 294.
69. See id. at 286-89.
70. See id. at 290-93.
71. See id. at 294-302.
72. See id. at 297-99.
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perhaps influenced by Lomen's memoranda, which briefed Justice
Douglas on the duty of the Court to construe a statute, if possible,
so as to avoid a conclusion that is unconstitutional, including in-
carcerating an entire race of people. At the end of the term,
Douglas had such a good experience with Lomen as his clerk that
he was more responsive to hiring a female clerk in later years.7 4
After leaving her clerkship, Lomen went on to serve in the Wash-
ington State Attorney General's Office and to represent General
Electric in a number of legal positions.
Since Lomen's clerkship term, the Court has made some inroads
in diversifying the Court. We have seen the influence of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court's first female Justice, who played
a pivotal role in preserving the right to choice and abortion access
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
and wrote for the Court in upholding the University of Michigan
Law School's race-conscious admission policy in Grutter v. Bol-
linger." Her life experiences, including being a mother and facing
difficulties in securing employment because of her gender yet
graduating third in her class at Stanford Law School, may have
colored her jurisprudence.7 1 Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg's personal experiences of having to overcome adversity be-
cause of her gender and being Jewish, and her legal experiences as
an advocate for the advancement of women's rights as a constitu-
tional principle, likely informed her perspective of issues in cases.
This was evident in United States v. Virginia," which opened the
state-sponsored Virginia Military Institute to women, and in her
opinion that Arizona school officials violated the constitutional
rights of a 13-year-old girl when they strip-searched her on the
suspicion that she might be hiding ibuprofen in her underwear in
Safford Unified School District v. Redding."
73. See Chandra, supra note 58, at 207.
74. Id. at 209-10.
75. Id. at 210-212.
76. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
77. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
78. Andrea Norman, From the Mud of the Salt, 45 ARIZ. ATT'Y 36, 40 (Sept. 2003); cf
JOAN BIsKUPic, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME COURT
BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 28 (2005); Judith Olans Brown, Wendy E. Parmet
& Mary E. O'Connell, The Rugged Feminism of Sandra Day O'Connor, 32 IND,. L. REV.
1219, 1221 (1999).
79. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).




Four years after Lomen's hiring, the exclusive clerkship doors
widened further. Peppers offers his essay about the first African-
American Supreme Court law clerk, William Thaddeus Coleman,
Jr., who began on September 1, 1948,81 clerking for Justice Frank-
furter. In the fall of 1941, Coleman, a Harvard Law graduate, was
only one of four minority law students in his first-year class in an
era where there were few minority judges and lawyers.8 2 Coleman
was indoctrinated in Frankfurter's clerkship tradition of embrac-
ing law clerks as members of the Justice's family and challenging
clerks to broaden their intellectual horizons." Coleman shared
meals at the Frankfurter home and was close with the Justice's
wife, Marion Frankfurter, whom he referred to as a "second moth-
er.""&l Despite having a Supreme Court clerkship under his belt,
Coleman faced initial difficulties in his post-clerkship job searches
due to the racial prejudices of the time." Nevertheless, he moved
onward to a tremendous career in private practice and govern-
ment service8 1 that included arguing nineteen cases before the
Court. Future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall also
asked him to formulate legal strategy in the litigation leading to
Brown v. Board of Education." He also served as Secretary of
Transportation to President Gerald Ford, advised seven American
presidents, and received the Presidential Medal of Freedom.
Taken together, the essays on Lomen and Coleman remind
readers that most Supreme Court law clerks have been white
males. In fact, only during the last few decades have Justices
hired more women and racial minorities. However, having diver-
sity among clerks remains a challenge at the Court today.
Given the lack of racial diversity in the Court law clerk pool, ac-
cording to Artemus Ward, increased diversity could allow the con-
sideration of different viewpoints that could influence the deci-
sion-making and opinion-writing processes.8 ' To illustrate his
point, Ward cited to a study showing that from 1986 to 2004,
81. See Todd C. Peppers, William Thaddeus Coleman Jr.: Breaking the Color Barrier
at the United States Supreme Court, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at 161, 161.
82. Id. at 163, 169.
83. Id. at 169.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 171-2.
86. Id.
87. 345 U.S. 972 (1953); see Peppers, supra note 81, at 173.
88. Peppers, supra note 81, at 173.
89. See Artemus Ward, Making Work for Idle Hands: William H. Rehnquist and His
Law Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at 350, 363.
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Asian Americans constituted seven percent of all Supreme Court
law clerks, African Americans were three percent, and Hispanics,
two percent.o There are some explanations for this. The dearth
of minority law clerks is probably a byproduct of the small number
in the Supreme Court law clerk pipeline." Notably, unless more
minority law clerks work for court of appeals judges (feeder judg-
es), who often recommend their clerks to the Justices, the number
of minority law clerks is unlikely to increase soon.92
As an aside, the Court is not unique in its need to diversify its
law clerk ranks. On a broader level, according to the Administra-
tive Office of the Court, a decline in the number of minority feder-
al judicial law clerks continued between the fiscal years 2006 and
2010." More minority law clerks would be a good thing. The law
clerk could help the Justice think through difficult decisions in-
volving race, including conferring with the Justice to discuss the
issues and the proper outcome. Beyond race, having law clerks
from diverse backgrounds (gender, sexual orientation, socioeco-
nomic, and work/life experience) would encourage robust and var-
ying discussions between Justices and clerks. On this topic, law
professor and former clerk to Justice Marshall, Sheryll Cashin,
thinks that diversity among clerks would improve the quality of
judging among the Justices, allow a broader array of people to
have a tremendous credential, and create confidence in the insti-
tution." Neal Katyal, former clerk to Justice Stephen Breyer and
former interim Acting Solicitor General, explained that his own
personal experiences made a difference for him in working on cas-
es when he said, "I'm not saying it had an influence on the deci-
sion, but if I got an immigration case, for example, I thought about
my parents, I thought about them as immigrants."
Importantly, while discussions about the need for diversity
amongst the law clerk ranks at the Court have mentioned African
Americans and Hispanics, lesser attention has been paid to Asian
90. Id.
91. Id. at 363.
92. See Introduction to IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at 1, 6.
93. See Todd Ruger, Statistics Show No Progress in Federal Court Law Clerk Diversity,
NATIONAL L.J. (May 2, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNILJ.jsp?id=1202551008298&Statistics show-no pro
gress-in federalcourtlawclerk diversity&sreturn=20120913002730.
94. See PBS Newshour: Color-Blind Court? (PBS television broadcast July 23, 1998)





American Supreme Court law clerk candidates. Of the approxi-
mately 1,800 law clerks who have worked at the Supreme Court,96
there have been less than forty Asian American law clerks." To-
day, even though Asian Americans have fared better than other
minority groups in securing clerkships, the lack of a meaningful
Asian American presence at One Front Street mirrors the relative-
ly few Asian American law firm partners, judges, senior govern-
ment officials, general counsel, or tenured law professors who
have managed to break through "the glass ceiling."
Sometimes a Supreme Court clerkship will make the biggest dif-
ference in being able to have a high-level career or not. Certain
career paths that would be almost impossible without a Supreme
Court Clerkship. As reflected by the book's contributors who are
law professors, the law teaching market is an example of this no-
tion, and a Supreme Court clerkship will open doors for someone
who wants to become a law professor. There are few Asian Ameri-
can law professors, and even fewer female Asian American law
professors." Asian Americans are also less actively recruited by
law school faculties compared to African Americans and Hispan-
ics.'o But when Asian Americans are appointed to the legal acad-
emy, they have an opportunity to write about issues impacting
Asian Americans, which have been largely ignored by mainstream
academics and courts.' In short, having a Supreme Court clerk-
ship matters.
96. Cf Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court
Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 60 (2008).
97. See List of Law Clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilList-of law clerksofthe
Supreme CourtoftheUnitedStates (last visited: June 24, 2012).
98. Cf Vikram David Amar & Kevin R. Johnson, Why U.S. News and World Report
Should Include a Faculty Diversity Index in its Ranking of Law Schools, FINDLAW'S WRIT
(Apr. 9, 2010),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printerjfriendly.pl?page=/amar/20100409.html ("Some
have also claimed that law faculties have relied on stereotypes of the 'passive' Asian to
argue that Asian-American faculty candidates whose scholarship was strong nevertheless
would not do well in the classroom, and thus to decline to hire them.")
99. See Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans in the Legal Academy: An Empirical and Nar-
rative Profile, 3 ASIAN L.J. 7, 8, 37 (1996); Shawn Ho, Co-Synthesis of Dynamics Behind the
Dearth of Asian American Law Professors: A Unique Narrative, 18 ASIAN AM. L.J. 57, 57
(2011).
100. See Alfred C. Yen, A Statistical Analysis of Asian Americans and the Affirmative
Action Hiring of Law Faculty, 3 ASIAN L.J. 39, 41 (1996); see also Amar & Johnson, supra
note 98 ("Asian Americans may face the stereotype that they are too passive or lack strong
social skills to do well in the classroom.")
101. See generally Neil Gotanda, New Directions in Asian American Jurisprudence, 17
AsIAN AM. L.J. 5 (2010). For example, in regard to the internment, Asian American schol-
ars have argued that over the years, Korematsu v. United States has been taken for granted
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IV. THE MODERN SUPREME COURT CLERKSHIP
The second half of In Chambers demonstrates how the Warren
Court changed the institutional rules for law clerks. Here, Jessee
Chopper writes an illuminating essay about Chief Justice Earl
Warren, for whom he clerked in 1960.102 Chopper remembered the
Chief as a kind, thoughtful, and generous person, who was often-
times humorously self-deprecating.1o3 This essay proceeded to de-
tail the duties of the Warren clerks, planning clerk reunions, and
honoring Warren after his death.' Interestingly, while Chopper
spent several sections detailing Warren's adherence to the princi-
ples of fairness, he spent less time in explaining Warren's
thoughts and opinions as to why he supported the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II when he was Attorney
General in California, other than to say that Warren later wrote
that he "deeply regretted" the action as "not in keeping with our
American concept of freedom."' 5 Chopper recalls that during
lunches, when Warren spoke about his experiences in California
before being selected for the Court, the Chief also talked at length
about the Japanese Exclusion Order."c' Although he was not
without reservations about this support for the internment as At-
torney General, Warren still defended the relocation at these
lunches.1o' For readers without a legal background, Warren's po-
sition may be a surprise given his reputation for protecting civil
rights and liberties.
by mainstream legal commentators as the obligatory citation for the origin of the Supreme
Court's strict scrutiny standard of review. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). However, contrary to the
popular perception that the Court addressed the constitutionality of the internment, it did
not. See Frank H. Wu, Profiling in the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of the Japa-
nese American Internment, 17 CRIM. JUST. 52, 55 (2002) ("Strangely, the internment cases
appear to have evaded the most basic question. That question is whether it is constitutional
to order the mass incarceration of persons as to whom no individual showing of guilt has
been made, ostensibly because of national security, though also with the use of racial classi-
fications.') Korematsu only discussed the constitutionality of the exclusion order. Jerry
Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 949-52
(2004).
102. See Jessee H. Chopper, Clerking for Chief Justice Earl Warren, in IN CHAMBERS,
supra note 1, at 263.
103. Id. at 272.
104. Id. at 279.
105. Id. at 274; see also Eric L. Muller, All the Themes But One, 66 U. CHICAGO L. REV.
1395, 1410 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998)).
106. Id. at 273-74.
107. Id. at 274.
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Equally insightful is Robert 0' Neil's essay about his clerkship
experience with Justice William J. Brennan.'o Brennan was Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall's closest friend and ally on the Court.
Brennan and Marshall shared similar views on race and social
policy, even though their backgrounds were as different as their
skin colors."o' Brennan grew up in Newark, New Jersey, the son
of labor organizer, William Joseph Brennan, Sr., and Agnes Bren-
nan, both immigrants to this country from Ireland."o Brennan's
childhood and youth were undistinguished. He attended the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania and eventually graduated from Harvard
Law School.'1 ' After graduation, Brennan began working for a
labor defense law firm in Newark, representing clients that his
father had fought against as a labor organizer." 2 In 1949, Bren-
nan accepted a seat on the New Jersey Superior Court as a trial
judge and only one year after that, in 1950, he was appointed to
the New Jersey Court of Appeals." 3 Just two years later, he was
108. See Robert M. O'Neil, Charting Civil Liberties and Protecting Free Expression:
Learning from and Working with Justice William J. Brennan, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note
1, at 284, 291.
109. See HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL & THE PERSISTENCE OF
RACISM IN AMERICA 211 (1998) ("Brennan could almost count on Marshall's vote. Clearly,
in civil liberties, criminal justice, and civil rights cases, these two men voted as one."); see
also SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 295 (2010);
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 360 (1998).
110. See CLARE CUSHMAN, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES,
1879-1995 446 (2d ed. 1995).
111. See Hunter R. Clark, The Pulse of Life in Justice Brennan's Jurisprudence, 46
DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1997) ("[Brennan] worked his way through the University of Pennsylva-
nia's undergraduate Wharton School of Finance and Commerce. With the support of his
first wife, the former Marjorie Leonard, he graduated from Harvard Law School in 1931.").
112. See CUSHMAN, supra note 110, at 447 ("After law school, Brennan returned to New
Jersey and joined Pitney, Hardin, and Skinner, a prominent Newark firm with a corporate
practice. He developed a reputation as a quick thinker and a tireless worker, helping with
major clients by handling labor relations disputes. It was strange for Brennan to find him-
self representing management in labor disputes, but he worked hard at being fair and
commanded the respect of the unions, due in part to his father's background. By 1938,
settled in a house he bought in South Orange, Brennan became a partner in the firm."); see
also MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 13 (1998)
("Of the seven liberal justices who served on the Court during 1953-69 ... [olnly Brennan
had an arguably middle-class background, at least after his father had risen from coal
shoveler to prominent labor leader and municipal official."); Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and
Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223
(1998) (reporting that Brennan's father rose through the labor ranks to become a labor
leader, and that his father's personal experiences serve as an explanation for the origins of
Brennan's concern with individual dignity).
113. See CUSHMAN, supra note 110, at 448 ("Brennan became involved in a successful
reform of the New Jersey court system to eliminate delays, inefficiency, and corruption. In
1949, Republican governor Alfred Driscoll appointed Brennan, a Democrat, as judge on the
newly reorganized Superior Court. Brennan quickly became a trusted lieutenant to New
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appointed to the New Jersey Supreme Court. After President
Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Justice Brennan in 1956, he
"was to become the most important intellectual influence on the
Warren Court, [and] would also rank as one of the greatest Justic-
es in the nation's history.""' Like many Justices, Brennan relied
on former law school classmates turned law professors to select his
clerks."' O'Neil notes that Brennan's clerks' experiences in the
drafting of opinions were not consistent.' Just like Marshall,
Brennan supervised his clerks much less, and relied on their
memoranda much more during the later years of his tenure.'17
Still, the collegiality of the Brennan chambers was consistent,
O'Neil remembers."' Judge Richard A. Posner, who was then
O'Neil's co-clerk, remembers Brennan as a "gracious, considerate,
outgoing, unpretentious, genial, and undemanding boss""' who
utilized his strong ability to compromise with other Justices. 20
"This made it easier for him to get a majority than it would have
been for more 'principled' justices."1 2' These former clerks recall
Brennan's commitment to the principles of racial equality, free
expression, and religious liberty.'22 In a clerkship that taught
caution and humility, Brennan "encouraged his clerks to get to
know (and respect) the other justices."'2 3 O'Neil recalls the time
that he was used judiciously by Brennan in Wong Sun v. United
States,'2 4 a key Supreme Court opinion that applied the "inde-
pendent source" exception to the exclusionary rule.'2 5 Wong Sun
centered on a series of warrantless drug busts in San Francisco's
Tenderloin and Richmond districts, involving Chinese American
Jersey's Chief Justice, Arthur Vanderbilt. In 1950, Brennan was elevated to the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court.").
114. HOROWITZ, supra note 112, at 8 (1998); see also Scott Goldstein, Guardian at the
Gate: Brennan Immortalized at Supreme Court Entry, N.Y. LAWYER, Feb. 5, 2001, at 4
("[Brennan] wrote 1,360 opinions in his 34 years on the court, including New York Times v.
Sullivan in support of freedom of the press and Baker v. Carr embracing the one-person,
one-vote concept.").
115. See O'Neil, supra note 108, at 286-87.
116. Id. at 290.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 9, 9
(1997).
120. See Eric J. Segall, The Court: A Talk with Judge Richard Posner, THE N.Y. REVIEW,
Sept. 29, 2011, at 47.
121. Id.
122. See O'Neil, supra note 8, at 291; Posner, supra note 119, at 12.
123. O'Neil, supra note 8, at 291-92.
124. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
125. Id. at 487.
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defendants and a Chinese American narcotics agent working un-
dercover. 126 O'Neil recalls a question that Brennan had about the
location of the laundry in San Francisco and how, fortuitously, he
had a map handy of the city since he taught there before his clerk-
ship.'27 At Brennan's suggestion, O'Neil brought the map to Jus-
tice Tom Clark, who wrote the dissenting opinion, to demonstrate
the location of the laundry was not actually in Chinatown as Jus-
tice Clark had so strongly advocated.128 In fact, Clark wrote in his
initial draft of his dissent that the laundry should have been easy
to find.'29 But the map that O'Neil carried showed that the laun-
dry that was initially searched in the case was actually a measur-
able distance from Chinatown--in Russian Hill.3 o In having
O'Neil serve as the messenger, Brennan indirectly accomplished
his goal -- to correct a fellow justice.'
In this modern era, one of the most prominent and lasting ex-
amples of the Justice and clerk mentorship was the relationship
126. Id. at 472-76.




131. As an author of legal writings about Asian Americans and the law, I see benefits of
having an Asian-American law clerk. As an example, I could not help but imagine if there
had been an Asian American clerking in the chambers of Justice Brennan and Clark at
that the time Wong Sun was on the Court's docket. Working with Robert O'Neil, the clerk
could have been able to provide additional information beyond ushering a map down the
hallway. This hypothetical law clerk may have also been a native San Franciscan with
first-hand knowledge of not only the City, but also the Chinese culture, and could have
provided insight and context to the record (which is often missing) to contribute to conver-
sations about crime policy during that era. Wong Sun was decided during an eventful
decade for America, and the crimes committed then reflected the times. While little is
known about the role Chinese dealers played in the drug trade in San Francisco in the
decades leading up to the carefree sixties, some criminologists have asserted that during
that time, Chinese sailors began to supply drug dealers in Chinatown who then sold to
other ethnic groups. See Sheldon Zhang & Ko-lin Chin, The Declining Significance of Triad
Societies in Transnational Illegal Activities, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 469, 473 (2003); see
also Angela Saurine, Grassy Knoll Where Flower Power Blooms, SUNDAY MAIL, May 9,
2010, at 1 ("San Francisco was the centre of hippie culture in the 1960s ... embracing
psychedelic rock music, the sexual revolution, communal living and the use of drugs such
as marijuana and LSD to explore alternative states of consciousness."). It was a time when
Chinese youth gangs were slowly forming in Chinatown and outlying areas. See Calvin
Wah Toy, A Short History of Asian Gangs in San Francisco, 9 JUST. Q. 647, 653 (1992). It
was common practice for Chinese American federal agents to go undercover and conduct
narcotics investigations in Chinatown. These agents often used informants to facilitate
drug busts. See, e.g., Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1965);
Elkanich v. United States, 327 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1964); Chin Kay v. United States,
311 F.2d 317, 319 (9th Cir. 1963); Ong Way Jong v. United States, 245 F.2d 392 (9th Cir.
1957); Sun B. Lee v. United States, 246 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1957); People v. Castedy, 15
Cal. Rptr. 413, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
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forged between Fourth Circuit Judge Harvie Wilkinson III and
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Judge Wilkinson's father and Powell
were best friends. 3 2 To Wilkinson, Powell was a second father
and a constant school master during childhood.133 Wilkinson
characterizes his clerkship as a happy time.'34 He drove Justice
Powell to and from the Court.' Wilkinson states that judging
was never "quick or easy for him.""' He would sometimes have
dinner at Justice Powell's apartment where occasionally, "Mrs.
Powell would read a mystery or even certiorari petitions to [the
Justice] in the living room.""3 According to Wilkinson, Powell did
not hire clerks ideologically and always held high standards." To
him, political leaning was not an issue, nor was gender.139 Pow-
ell's focus was on academic merit and likeability.'40 Powell served
on the Court for fifteen years and for eight years on the Fourth
Circuit after his retirement.14' In his retirement, while serving on
the Circuit, Wilkinson and Powell were colleagues.' 42
More insight is provided in Artemus Ward's contribution about
Justice William H. Rehnquist and his law clerks.143 A sense of
collegiality was also found in Rehnquist's chambers, which func-
tioned much like the chambers of his colleagues."* In the 1972
term, Rehnquist founded the cert pool, which clerks used to divide
up the voluminous certiorari petitions filed with the Court.'
From an efficiency standpoint, Rehnquist looked favorably upon
the cert pool because it required only one clerk from the pool to
review certiorari petitions, which freed up his clerks to review and
write memoranda for each petition.'46 While this could give the
clerks unwieldy influence as gatekeepers, Ward explains that
132. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Personal View by a
Former Clerk, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at 342, 342.
133. Id. at 342.
134. Id. at 344.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 345.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 344, 346.
139. Id. at 346.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 344.
142. Id. at 342.
143. See Ward, supra note 89, at 352.
144. Id. at 356.




there are intentional checks in place that would prevent law
clerks from acting improperly in such an important role.147
Notably, in Ward's earlier book, he warned that ambitious and
passionate law clerks could lead to self-serving partisanship in
attempting to set the agenda through the cert. pool if the Justices
delegated too much authority in the opinion writing process.148
But with Ginsburg's chambers, clerks have little influence on
crafting constitutional law.149 Similarly, Stevens writes his first
drafts himself, and only relies on his clerks for comments on con-
tent and style.5 o Peppers explores this issue of judicial influence
more fully in his earlier book, which refers to a former Brennan
law clerk who was asked "whether Brennan's law clerks wielded
any influence over the justice's decision-making." 5 1  The former
clerk replied that "law clerks did have some influence" with their
Justice, but that it was "an influence that involved exposing the
justice to salient facts in the record rather than an influence that
changed the justice's mind once all the facts were before him."152
In an essay about Justice Harry Blackmun and his clerks, Har-
old Koh is was quoted as saying that Blackmun set the tone and
provided the intellect for his opinions and it was his law clerks
who largely typed the words under his ultimate guidance.'53 Each
law clerk understood that their job was to the assist the Justice
with his opinion-writing and not to make decisions.' 4 Clerks will
speak up when they having something to say, and sometimes play
devil's advocate.' The Justice was nominated by the President,
and confirmed by the Senate, while the law clerk was not, but this
deliberation process is not a new one. Bennett Boskey writes that,
with respect to judicial decision-making, Justice Harlan Stone was
always open to discussing how he would cast his vote at confer-
ence with his law clerks.'"' While he was usually clear on how he
147. Id.
148. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3, at 133.
149. See Todd C. Peppers, The Modern Clerkship: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Her
Law Clerks, in IIN CHAMBERS, supra note 1, at 391, 398.
150. See Laura Krugman Ray, Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul Stevens
and Wiley B. Rutledge, 41 CONN. L. REV. 211, 241 (2008).
151. PEPPERS, supra note 2, at 158.
152. Id.
153. See Randall P. Bezanson, Good Old Number Three: Harry Blackmun and His
Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 326, 333-34.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 334-35.
156. See Bennett Boskey, The Family of Stone Law Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note
1, at 98, 102.
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would vote after oral argument, he would still listen to comments
offered by law clerks, even if he was not persuaded to change his
vote.17
Just like many newly appointed Justices before him had done,
Rehnquist initially drafted a number of his own opinions when he
joined the Court then began delegating the opinion-writing to his
clerks."1s As with the other Justices discussed in this review,
there was also a human side to the Justice. Rehnquist was re-
sponsible for organizing many of the social events for clerks, in-
cluding the orientation gathering and annual Christmas party
gathering."5 9 He also regularly played tennis with his clerks.6 o
Chief Justice John Roberts, a former Rehnquist clerk, recalled
Rehnquist's practice of establishing betting pools on just about
everything including presidential elections and sporting events. 16
Roberts also recalled Rehnquist's unassuming demeanor and his
habit of taking walks with clerks to discuss cases and using them
as sounding boards.162
In the closing chapter, Peppers suggests that a representative
example of the modern Supreme Court clerkship can be found in
Ginsburg's chambers, where she carefully supervises her clerks
and holds exacting analytical standards." In selecting clerks,
Ginsburg initially relies on the recommendations of Columbia Law
School Dean David Schizer, and appraisals of certain Court of Ap-
peals judges.'" To Ginsburg, clerks must also show respect for
her secretaries and be able to have certain judgment and common
sense." According to Peppers, Ginsburg promotes a healthy bal-
ance between the clerk's work obligations and personal lives."'
She states that clerks work on the weekends when necessary and
the work schedule is flexible to allow clerks to leave for weddings
and religious holidays."' Her former law clerks describe her as
having a warm and kind personality and a wonderful sense of
humor.' 8 Consistent with her pre-judicial career as an advocate
157. Id.
158. Ward, supra note 89, at 371.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 374-75.
161. Id. at 377.
162. Id.
163. Peppers, supra note 149, at 391.
164. See id. at 393.
165. Id. at 398-99.
166. Id. at 395.
167. Id. at 399.
168. Id. at 399.
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for the advancement of women's rights as a constitutional princi-
ple, Peppers writes that Ginsburg hires more female and minority
candidates than other Justices."' The clerks are from a handful of
elite law schools: Columbia, Yale, or Harvard.' And continuing a
tradition from the Frankfurter era, Ginsburg treats her clerks as
members of her family and holds reunions every five years.171
V. THE INCREASE OF ASIAN AMERICAN JURISTS ON THE FEDERAL
BENCH AND THE POSSIBLE NOMINATION OF AN ASIAN AMERICAN TO
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
After reading In Chambers, and with the passing references to
the Japanese American internment and discussions of diversity in
mind, I thought about the potential appointment of an Asian
American Justice to the Court. This was not the first time. This
notion was perhaps originally encouraged by the appointment of
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the first Latina/o Justice on the Court,172
and before President Barack Obama nominated Elena Kagen to
replace retiring Justice John Paul Stevens on the Court, Harold
Koh, Deputy Secretary of State, was also considered in legal cir-
cles to be a potential candidate for that same seat.'73 Koh, the son
of immigrants from Korea and an international law expert, was a
former dean of Yale Law School and served as Assistant Secretary
of State of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in the Clinton
Administration.'74
At the dawn of a second term, I would suggest that this possibil-
ity is increased based by President Obama's previous judicial ap-
pointment record and the possibility that one or two justices may
169. See id. at 393.
170. Id. at 394.
171. See id. at 399.
172. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on the Nomination and Confirmation of the First
Latina Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Assimilation Demand at Work, 30 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 97, 98 (2011); cf Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice
For All, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2003) ("The current lack of diversity within the judi-
ciary is due to a number of factors such as the pool of experienced attorneys, political ties,
access to networking, and career opportunities.").
173. See Danny Serna, In Supreme Court Speculation, Koh v. Kagan, YALE DAILY NEWS
(Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2010/apr/21/in-supreme-court-
speculation-koh-v-kagan/ (discussing Koh as international law expert and liberal lion who
is a potential pick for the Supreme Court and describing him as one of the "most brilliant"
legal minds of our era).
174. See Frank Chi, Why Harold Koh Should Be the Next Supreme Court Justice,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2010, 7:09 PM), http/www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-chi/why-
harold=koh-should be_b_545298.htmlview.
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retire. Given the number of appointments of Asian Americans to
the federal bench by President Obama, the most in the history of
the federal judiciary, it may be just a matter of time." At a time
that Asian Americans are largely missing on the federal bench,
President Obama has nominated a record number of Asian Ameri-
cans to the federal judiciary, including historical appointments to
the federal bench: Dolly Gee, the first Chinese American woman,
Jackie Nguyen, the first Vietnamese American, and Lucy Koh, the
first Korean American."' He has elevated Magistrate Judge Ed-
ward Chen to Article III status and nominated District Judge
Denny Chin to sit on the Second Circuit."' President Obama also
nominated Goodwin Liu to the Ninth Circuit, but Liu withdrew
his nomination in response to strong Republican opposition in the
Senate. He was later appointed by Governor Jerry Brown to a
seat on the California Supreme Court.'
There is a potential beneficial impact of the appointment of a
qualified Asian American to the Court. I think that having an
Asian American on the Court could have a significant and positive
impact on American jurisprudence. If anyone thinks that the ra-
cial background of a law clerk or Justice does not make a differ-
ence, he or she should reflect on the experiences of Justice Thur-
good Marshall. Deborah Rhodes who clerked for Thurgood Mar-
shall during the October term of 1978 wrote that Marshall was the
only member of the Court who did not come from a privileged
background. 7 1 In fact, Marshall was the grandson of slaves.so
175. See Jesse J. Holland, Obama Increases of Female, Minority Judges, YAHOO NEWS
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/obama-increases-number-female-minority-judges-
154714372.html ("Nearly three of every four people [President Obamal has gotten con-
firmed to the federal bench are women or minorities.").
176. See Pat K. Chew & Luke T. Kelley-Chew, The Missing Minority Judges, 14 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 179, 180-81 (2010) (reporting that there are only twelve Asian-
American sitting judges, less than one percent of the 1289 sitting federal judges); Jonathan
Jew-Lim, A Brief Overview of President Obama's Asian American Judicial Nominee in
2010, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 227, 227 (2010).
177. See Maura Dolan, Goodwin Liu has blended in easily on California's Supreme
Court, L.A. TiMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http/articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/22/locala-me-justice-
liu-20121023.
178. See Bob Egelko, New Hope for Stalled Nomination of Lawyer to S.F. Federal Court,
S.F. CHRON., (Mar. 18, 2011), at C2; James Oliphant, GOP Blocks Judicial Appointment,
L.A. TIMES, (May 20, 2011), at 1, available at 2011 WLNR 10071754; Press Release, Alli-
ance for Justice, Alliance for Justice Says 400 Days of Obstruction Are Enough Calls For
Confirmation of Goodwin Liu to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, (May 17, 2011), availa-
ble at 5/17/11 States News Serv. 00:000:00.
179. See Deborah L. Rhode, Thurgood Marshall and His Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra
note 1, at 314.
180. Id.
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This fact, and his experiences in seeing racism, made him always
cognizant of racism."s' Marshall first applied to the University of
Maryland Law School; however, the school did not admit African
Americans. 18 2 Undaunted, Marshall applied to Howard Universi-
ty, where Dean Charles Hamilton Houston, Harvard's top African
American graduate, was implementing a course of study that
would prepare young African American lawyers to wage a battle
against discrimination.183 Marshall accepted admission and be-
came the top student in his first year class.184 After graduation,
segregation limited Marshall's job opportunities,' and although
offered the chance to earn an advanced law degree at Harvard, he
opened up his own practice.' He also worked alongside his for-
mer teacher and dean, Houston, helping Houston prepare reports
for the NAACP."' With the NAACP, Marshall observed the quali-
ty of schools available to African American children in contempla-
tion of a legal challenge to public school segregation. 8 8 His fight
against discriminatory practices as an NAACP civil rights attor-
ney chipped away at the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson."'
The fight for equality waged by the NAACP culminated in Mar-
shall's greatest victory ten years later with Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation,o arguably the most important legal case of the century.
In that case, he argued that segregation in the public schools hu-
miliated black children and deprived them of equal status.'
Marshall's victory in Brown ended the legal separation of black
and white children in public schools.'92 In 1961, several years af-
ter Marshall's success in Brown, President John F. Kennedy ap-
pointed him to serve on the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.'
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson appointed Marshall to the po-
181. Id.; see also BALL, supra note 109, at 17-18 (describing Marshall's early experiences
with racism while growing up in Baltimore).
182. See WILLIAMS, supra note 109, at 52-54.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 53-56.
185. See id. at 59 (noting that there were no firm positions for Howard's graduates be-
cause white Baltimore firms refused to hire black lawyers).
186. Id. at 61-62.
187. See id. at 59-63.
188. Id. at 57-58.
189. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
190. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
191. See BALL, supra note 109, at 5-6.
192. Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
193. See BALL, supra note 109, at 175.
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sition of Solicitor General.'94 In that role, Marshall advocated
strict enforcement of the new civil rights acts of 1957, 1960,' and
1964.196
As the first African American to be appointed to the Court,
Marshall's activist jurisprudence was apparent when he relent-
lessly promoted affirmative action and race-conscious policies as
remedies for the damage resulting from the nation's history of
slavery and racial bias."' Given his experiences and cognizance of
race matters, he was never reserved in telling his clerks stories.
As Rhodes noted, Marshall delighted in telling clerks that he was
sometimes mistaken for a messenger or elevator operator even at
the Court.9 s The Justice's perspective was reverberated in crimi-
nal cases and offered a window into a different world, one in which
individuals having less or having a different skin color suffer ad-
versely in everyday life.' Without doubt, Marshall was steadfast
against capital punishment and always instructed his clerks to
grant stays of execution, demanding that clerks call him no matter
what time of night when requests were filed.200 Marshall was a
great humanitarian and stressed the importance of volunteering
for pro bono cases, public service, and lawyers' obligation of ser-
vice to his clients.20'
Interestingly, Justice Clarence Thomas, who succeeded Mar-
shall upon his retirement, has also often reflected on the role his
personal experience and background played in shaping his under-
standing of the issues in cases. For instance, Thomas, who rarely
asks any questions during oral argument, once had a dialogue
with a petitioner's attorney about the history of lynching and Klu
Klux Klan activities in the American South with regard to an ar-
gument about his understanding of a burning cross as a tool to
inflict fear and intimidation on blacks in Virginia v. Black, where
the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to an ordi-
nance which made it a criminal offense to burn a cross to intimi-
date anyone for any reason.202 Significantly, Thomas's diatribe
altered the course of the debate and enhanced the analysis in the
194. Id. at 183, 188-190.
195. See id. at 188-92.
196. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).
197. See BALL, supra note 109, at 104-106; WILLIAMS, supra note 109, at 31-32.
198. See Rhode, supra note 179, at 315.
199. Id. at 320.
200. Id. at 321-22.
201. Id. at 323.
202. 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003).
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case in a way that any of the other sitting justices probably could
not have. Justice Thomas, relying on his experiences as a college
student at Holy Cross and law student at Yale Law School, again
compelled his peers to view a case from a different angle. This
was apparent in affirmative action cases where he has argued
against affirmative action programs for a number of reasons in-
cluding what he perceives to be the stigmatizing effects of any
race-based remedial program. 203 Accordingly, as we saw with the
appointments of Marshall and Thomas to the Court and the legacy
they created, an Asian American justice could influence Court de-
cisions and the decision-making process too.
An Asian American would bring new perspectives to the
Court.204 For example, looking back at the internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II, one has to speculate whether an
Asian American justice on the Court at that time would have
made a difference in the rulings. Life experience informs and edu-
cates judges. The late Federal District Judge Robert Takasugi
and Court of Appeals Judge Wallace Tashima, both Japanese
Americans, experienced Japanese internment first hand when
they were forced to evaluate their homes and made to feel like for-
eigners in their own land.205  Ninth Circuit Judge Wallace
Tashima has recalled his own experiences as an internee in a War
Relocation Authority ("WRA") internment camp during World War
II and drew similarities between government overreaching at that
time and recent detainments and intrusive investigations under
the umbrella of the Patriot Act after the September 11th attacks.2 0 6
Arguably, an Asian American justice may also have empathy for
immigrants based on their humble backgrounds and their aware-
ness of Asian American history. Denny Chin, Judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is the son of Chinese im-
migrants. 207  Both of his parents worked in New York's China-
town, his father was as a cook while his mother was a seam-
203. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350-51 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
204. See Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielson, Examining Experience, and Judicial
Decision Making, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 351 (2012) (arguing that "minority judges tend to
assess discrimination claims differently than white judges").
205. Josh Hsu, Asian American Judges: Identity, Their Narratives, & Diversity on the
Bench, 11 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 92, 98 (2006).
206. A. Wallace Tashima, Play It Again, Uncle Sam, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7-11
(2005).
207. Denny Chin, Representation for Immigrants: A Judge's Personal Perspective, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 636, 637 (2009).
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stress.208 California Supreme Court Justice Ming Chin's parents
came to this country with little money and worked as potato farm-
ers.20 Federal Judge Edward Chen has also commented on the
effect of his life experiences on his judicial disposition. 21 0 Facing
discrimination infused him with skepticism towards law enforce-
ment, as well as receptiveness to the climate of discrimination.'
Judge Chen acknowledges that, "I find that my own life experienc-
es inform my understanding and perceptions of the world as a
judge, whether I am evaluating evidence and arguments on the
bench or communicating with disputants as a settlement judge."2 12
Taken together, their background stories provide some contextual
evidence that "Asian Americans may have more sympathy for im-
migrants because of their exposure to racism and xenophobia."m
The unique perspectives of these Asian American judges are anal-
ogous to the reason that President Obama nominated Justice
Sotomayor. President Obama was looking for empathy and found
it in Sotomayor's personal background. She is the daughter of
Puerto Rican immigrants who grew up in the housing projects of
the South Bronx, and excelled academically at Princeton and Yale
Law School. 214
An Asian American justice might bring a unique perspective in
immigration cases and issues about bilingual education and bilin-
gual ballots that may have an adverse impact on the Asian Ameri-
can community, as well as other immigrant communities.2 1s The
justice will be cognizant of the long legacy of discrimination
against Asian Americans that has existed on many fronts, includ-
ing immigration,216 business,21 education, and on social and politi-
208. Id. at 638.
209. See Ming W. Chin, My Journey As An Asian American, 8 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 150,
150-51 (2009).
210. Chen, supra note 172, at 1120.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Hsu, supra note 205, at 112.
214. Johnson, supra note 172, at 100-01; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer and a
Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at Al.
215. See Raymond Tatalovich, Official English as Nativist Backlash, in Immigrants Out!
THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 78, 78-102
(Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local
Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 611 (2012).
216. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (upholding the denial of citi-
zenship to Japanese); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 725 (1889) (upholding
Chinese Exclusion Act); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 610-11 (1889)
(limiting ethnic Chinese from returning to United States after leaving the country); Besho
v. United States, 178 F. 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1910) (upholding an immigration act limiting
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cal levels.218 As Harold Koh wrote twenty years ago in a preface
for Asian Americans and the Supreme Court: A Documentary His-
tory,
The history of Asian Americans and the Supreme Court ... is
a tale of almost unbroken sadness; not of victors and justice,
but of victims and injustice. It is a story of a people who have
largely been objects, not shapers, of a legal system they do not
fully understand, a language they do not fluently speak, a
melting pot into which they have not been allowed to assimi-
late. It is an account of Americans who have been treated as
unwanted foreigners . . . .219
This historical resentment toward Asian Americans reverberat-
ed in the laws that barred them from meaningful participation in
American society.220 Some Supreme Court justices even encour-
aged this. For example, while John Marshall Harlan is remem-
bered as a defender of African-American civil rights, he is less
known for his frequent votes against Asian litigants in important
immigration cases, which were consistent with his belief that the
Chinese were racially unsuited to live in the United States.221
Justice Stephen J. Field also expressed sentiments of xenophobia
in finding ways to exclude the Chinese in his opinions.222
privileges of naturalization of Japanese); In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223, 224 (C.D. Cal. 1878)
(holding that a Chinese immigrant was ineligible for naturalization).
217. See Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating racially motivated
laundry ordinances); Charles J. McClain & Laurene Wu McClain, The Chinese Contribution
to the Development of Americans, in ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION AND THE CHINESE
COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, 1882-1943, 12 (Sucheng Cheng, ed., 1993) (nothing that 240 of
320 laundries in San Francisco were Chinese-owned). These laundries were symbols of
Chinese success, and were often targets of attack. Id.
218. See RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL
AMERICA 200-02 (1993) (describing hostile political climate toward Chinese immigrants);
Esther Ngan-Ling Chow, The Feminist Movement: Where Are All the Asian American Wom-
en?, in FROM DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA, 187-
88 (Ronald Takaki, ed., 1994) (discussing early nineteenth century legislation excluding
Chinese immigrants from being lawful members of society).
219. Harold Koh, Foreword to ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY ix (Hyung-Chan Kim, ed. 1992).
220. See, e.g., HYUNG-CHAN KIM, AMERICAN NATURALIZATION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY:
ASIAN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE IN ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 2 (1996) (describing unjust policies in early United States history against persons
of Asian history); McClain & McClain, supra note 217, at 4.
221. See Gabriel J. Chin, The First Justice Harlan By the Numbers: Just How Great Was
"The Great Dissenter?" 32 AKRON L. REV. 629, 633 (1999).
222. See Richard P. Cole & Gabriel J. Chin, Emerging From the Margins of Historical
Consciousness: Chinese Immigrants and the History ofAmerican Law, 17 LAW AND HISTORY
REV. 325, 358 (1999).
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More to the point, the Justice will be aware that Supreme Court
jurisprudence has shown that the racialization of whites, blacks,
and Asians are different. The racialization of Asians, as depicted
in significant Supreme Court cases is reflected in American law.
First, in Ozawa v. United States,2 23 and United States v. Thind,224
Justice George Sutherland struggled with definitions of "white"
and "race." In testing the meaning of the Naturalization Act of
1790, in Ozawa, Justice Sutherland ruled that only "whites" and
persons of African nativity could become naturalized citizens and
that Asians were excluded because they were obviously neither.225
In 1922, the Ozawa Court held that the term "white person" in-
cluded "only a person of what is popularly known as the Cauca-
sian race" and that a Japanese person was not white.226
Second, in Thind, the litigant also claimed that he was "white"
according to the definition in Ozawa.227 Bhagat Thind was a full-
blooded Indian and a high caste Hindu, but argued that he was
racially "Caucasian. "228 Sutherland opined that the majority of
white Americans would reject Asians, such as Ozawa and Thind,
as full members, either individually or through their democratic
instructions.229 The Court decided that Thind could not be a natu-
ralized citizen of the United States because he was not a "white
person."23 0 Third, in Lum v. Rice,231 the Court held that the exclu-
sion on account of race of a child of Chinese ancestry from a state
high school did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and concurrently, minority children
were excluded from attending schools reserved for whites. Fourth,
as discussed throughout this Review and In Chambers, the in-
ternment of Japanese Americans was the perhaps the most egre-
gious case reflecting an anti-Asian animus in the twentieth centu-
ry.
Modernly, and looking prospectively with regard to affirmative
action cases including Texas v. Fisher,232 an Asian American jus
223. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
224. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
225. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198-99.
226. Id. at 197.
227. Thind, 261 U.S. 204.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 209-10.
230. Id. at 215.
231. Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
232. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
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tice may be better able to notice the nuances of the debate and not
the unique situations that Asian Americans find themselves in
when they are included in affirmative action programs and when
they have not been.2 33  At the core of the Fisher ligation is the
University of Texas admissions policy which inter alia allows
whites and Asians to benefit from the University's efforts to
achieve the educational benefits of diversity.234 Until Grutter v.
Bollinger"" and Fisher, there was a tendency to frame affirmative
action in black and white terms, which diminishes the significance
of Asian-American under-representation and invites misconcep-
tions colored by the model minority myth: the stereotype that all
Asian Americans are succeeding in business and academics be-
cause of their hard work and do not need any governmental assis-
tance.2 36  The model minority myth has created a stereotype, of
Asian Americans as one monolithic ethnic group that has achieved
success through education and hard work without the assistance
of governmental benefits.237 Certain Asian American groups still
need some type of assistance. 238  For example, Filipinos and
Southeast Asians, such as the Indochinese, tend to rely on finan-
cial and educational assistance. 239  These groups could directly
233. See generally, Brief of Asian American Justice Center, Asian American Institute,
Asian American Law Caucus, et al. as Amici Curiae, Supporting Respondents, Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328.); Brief of the Asian American Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Chinese for Affirmative Action, et al. as Amici Curaie, sup-
porting Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915).
234. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Tex. 2009), affd,
631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
235. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
236. See Harvey Gee, The Need for Asian Americans to be Included in the Affirmative
Action Debate, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 621, 623 (1997).
237. See, e.g., FRANK H. Wu, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 44
(2002) (describing the misconception that Asian Americans vindicate the American Dream);
Gabriel J. Chin, Sumi Cho, Jerry Kang & Frank Wu, Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific
Americans Toward a Community of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129, 148 (1996) (finding that the myth emphasizes the success of Asian
Americans, especially as compared to other people of color); Sumi K. Cho, Converging Ste-
reotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 185 (1997) (noting that the myth paints a misleading portrait
of group-wide economic, educational, and professional success).
238. See Gale Holland, "Model Minority" Myth Hides Reality, L.A. Times, June 10, 2008,
at 3 (reporting that more than half of Asian-American students attend community colleges
or minimally selective four-year colleges and are likely to come from low-income families
with limited English skills).
239. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
81-82 (2001).
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benefit from affirmative action. 240 The myth is so prevalent that
even Supreme Court Justices seem to believe it. Justice Thomas
has portrayed Asian Americans as a minority group whose accom-
plishments justify opposition to affirmative action.2 41 Specifically,
Justice Thomas has asserted that because Asian Pacific Ameri-
cans have substantially greater family incomes than whites, they
have "transcended the ravages caused even by harsh legal and
social discrimination."242 Justice Thomas has also stated that
Asian Americans should not be the beneficiaries of affirmative
action, because they are "overrepresented in key institutions."24
Justice Thomas' sentiments were echoed by Justice Stevens, who
spoke to a group of Chicago lawyers at a luncheon a few years ago
and compared current affirmative action for African Americans to
past affirmative action for Asian Americans.2 " Justice Stevens
noted that Asian Americans have made great progress in the past
few decades, and opined that Asian Americans no longer need to
be considered as beneficiaries of any racial preferences.245 Appar-
ently, the Court is beginning to see beyond the myth. This term,
Justice Samuel Alito at oral argument in Fisher when he voiced
skepticism when he asked university counsel Gregory Garre about
whether the Texas plan appropriately accounts for determining
the admission rates for Fillipino American and Cambodian Ameri-
cans. 246
In a criminal context, an Asian American justice may also be
cognizant that Asian Americans are often overlooked in the crimi-
nal law literature despite their contribution to legal history and
contemporary conversations about crime policy. Even though
much of the focus about the implications of race on the American
240. See, e.g., WU, supra note 237, at 51 (explaining that while Asian Americans have
done well educationally, they remain underrepresented in higher education at all levels
beyond student and entry-level positions); William C. Kidder, Negative Action Versus Af-
firmative Action: Asian Pacific Americans Are Still Caught in the Crossfire, 11 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 605, 623-24 (2006) (finding that some underrepresented Asian Pacific American
groups such as Filipinos, Southeast Asians, and Pacific Islanders can directly benefit from
affirmative action in higher education).
241. See ROSALIND S. CHOU & JOE R. FEAGIN, THE MYTH OF THE MODEL MINORITY:
ASIAN AMERICANS FACING RACISM 14 (2008).
242. Id. at 14.
243. Id.
244. Charles Lane, Stevens Gives Rare Glimpse of High Court's 'Conference'; Justice
Details His Thoughts on Affirmative Action Case in Michigan, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003,
at A3.
245. Id.
246. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Supreme Court cause 11-345, Appellant's original
argument, transcript, page 52, lines 4-20.
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justice system has been placed on African Americans and Hispan-
ics, an Asian American justice may be more attentive to the pat-
terns of federal sentencing handed out to Asian Americans who
are less likely to be incarcerated when compared with African
Americans and Hispanics.247 Asian Americans experience sentenc-
ing leniency for fraud crimes and drug crimes where African
Americans and Hispanics are punished more severely.2 48 Asian
Americans are also punished similarly to white criminals for most
offenses, aside from immigration."4 Finally, an Asian American
justice may be more culturally competent in understanding the
legal representation of Asian Americans in criminal matters re-
quiring knowledge of their culture, which may be perceived as for-
eign or mysterious to non-Asians. The knowledge and insights
that they could bring to bear could help fulfill the guarantee of due
process of law and promote increased public confidence in the
United States criminal justice system.250
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, Peppers and Ward's compilation of engaging
firsthand stories and is a welcome contribution to the ongoing lit-
erature about the Court. In Chambers is illuminating since it re-
veals insights into the nuts and bolts of serving as a Supreme
Court law clerk, and also by providing a peek into the relation-
ships between Justice and clerk. Even regular Court watchers
may be surprised by the nuggets offered into this exclusive world.
The ideas and themes found in the book and the implications
247. See Brian D. Johnson & Sara Betsinger, Punishing the "Model Minority": Asian-
American Criminal Sentencing Outcomes in Federal District Courts, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1045,
1064 (2009).
248. Id. at 1075.
249. Id. at 1049.
250. Asian American judges may have a different perspective in many stages of litiga-
tion including pre-trial conference, settlement conference and at jury selection, trial, and
criminal sentencing. They may also interpret the issues differently in cases involving ra-
cial discrimination and criminal cases involving a cross-cultural defense strategy advanced
by a defendant. This awareness could provide insights about the nexus between mitigation
and crime, which could ultimately influence juror opinions and judicial rulings. Cultural
competency challenges the assumptions the court and prosecution have about defendants
and provides a cultural context that rejects the wholesale stereotyping of persons who
share the same cultural background. Asian-American judges may be better able to move
beyond stereotypes to understand that Asian Americans are not one monolithic group, but
are a population consisting of diverse cultures with differing beliefs, values, customs, pat-
terns, norms and behavior. See Harvey Gee, Presenting Stories from Different Shores:
Asian Americans and Cross-Cultural Competency in Capital Litigation, 5 Nw.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L. REV. 247, 249 (2012).
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made in this essay about encouraging more diversity at the Court
will hopefully encourage other scholars to further mine the ar-
chives and to embark on writing projects that not only shed fur-
ther light on the Court and its interworkings, but present new
ideas for justices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Reading a book with which one agrees on the basic assumptions
and goals can be a reaffirming and educational experience. How-
ever, reading a book with which one disagrees about some of its
basic assumptions and goals can be a stimulating and even en-
lightening experience, particularly if the book presents a logical
argument, a compelling and laudable vision, and an openness to
opposing views. For this reviewer, Professor Bruce Ledewitz has
written just such a book.'
There are many conclusions and arguments in Ledewitz's book
with which I disagree. Our respective books on the Establishment
Clause arise from, and arrive at, two very opposite ends of the
* Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law, and Director of the
Hagemann Center for Legal and Public Policy Research.
** Researcher for the Hagemann Center for Legal and Public Policy Research, Univer-
sity of South Dakota School of Law.
1. Bruce Ledewitz, Church, State and the Crisis in American Secularism (2011) (Indi-
ana University Press 2011, PP. 312, $29.95. ISBN: 978-0-253-35634-5). Bruce Ledewitz
is a professor at Duquesne University School of Law.
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constitutional and philosophical spectrums.2 And for this reason,
some criticisms articulated in this review may seem somewhat
biased or distorted, at least in the eyes of the author. However,
addressing an almost completely opposite ideological viewpoint
from that of the author may also allow a reviewer to see the book
in a way that more ideologically compatible readers might not.
In Church, State and the Crisis in American Secularism,
Ledewitz sets ambitious goals. He pursues a constitutional doc-
trine or model that tries to resolve all the inconsistencies and con-
tradictions in the Court's confused and erratic Establishment
Clause jurisprudence that has evolved over the last half century.
Ledewitz's resolution strives to find common ground between reli-
gious believers and traditionalists, secularists and atheists. Fur-
thermore, Ledewitz tackles what is probably the most divisive and
controversial issue in the Establishment Clause area-namely,
the issue of religious expression or displays on public property.
The focus of this book is secularism. Ledewitz believes that sec-
ularism is the future of America. But to survive and prosper, sec-
ularism cannot operate the way it traditionally has, with such a
prominent anti-religion focus. The new secularism, according to
Ledewitz, needs to recognize the presence of religion in American
society. Furthermore, the new secularism cannot be defined by
moral relativism. It has to recognize the existence and influence
of objective ideals and values-or, in other words, a higher law.
According to Ledewitz, secularists must make peace with religion
and with various objective values that in the past have often been
associated with religion, since such values have relevance to all of
society, despite the fact that religion may have seemingly com-
mandeered them long ago.
Ledewitz argues that, under the government speech doctrine,
government should be able to speak of and advocate for a higher
law. This higher law can be likened to natural law or the histori-
cal tenants of western civilization. Just because religion might
believe in the same values, and just because religion has previous-
ly used those values to promote religious exercise, Ledewitz does
not think those values should become off-limits to government
speech. As long as government bases its speech on nonreligious
motives, it can promote this higher law. Thus, if certain religious
imagery or displays promote values such as justice and compas-
2. See PATRICK M. GARRY, WRESTLING WITH GOD: THE COURTS' TORTUOUS
TREATMENT OF RELIGION (2006).
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sion, government should not be precluded from advocating such
values.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CRISIS
Because of very sharp and basic differences between the justic-
es, the United States Supreme Court has been inconsistent and
confusing in its Establishment Clause doctrine.' But, as Ledewitz
argues, strict separationism is the best policy and the best means
by which to satisfy the constitutional doctrine of neutrality.4 To
Ledewitz, the Establishment Clause crisis comprises all the ways
in which the Court has departed from the rule of neutrality. Con-
trary to a strict rule of neutrality, for instance, the Supreme Court
has viewed certain accommodations of religion as constitutionally
permissible.' But if accommodation is constitutionally acceptable,
then is neutrality the constitutionally required doctrine?'
Ledewitz acknowledges that even when the Supreme Court has
followed the neutrality approach, its decisions have not been able
to resolve the Establishment Clause crisis. This acknowledgment,
however, creates further questions as to whether, in fact, neutrali-
ty is the most appropriate doctrine for the Court to follow. Fur-
thermore, while citing Everson v. Board of Education and Lemon
v. Kurtzman-cases in which the Court discusses the Establish-
ment Clause as erecting a high and impregnable wall of separa-
tion between church and state-Ledewitz admits that those deci-
3. Ledewitz is one of many scholars to have commented on the confusing state of Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and
Prospects of "Test" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 323 (1995);
Roxanne L. Houtman, Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State, 55 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 395, 397, 403-04 (2005); William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter With Equality?, 75
IND. L.J. 193, 194 (2000); Russell L. Weaver, Like a Ghoul in a Late Night Horror Movie, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 587, 590 (2003); Keith Werhan, Navigating the New Neutrality: School
Vouchers, the Pledge, and the Limits of a Purposive Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS
L.J. 603, 610 (2003).
4. LEDEWITZ, supra note 2, at 14; see, e.g., Michael McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992).
5. LEDEWITZ, supra note 2, at 18-20.
6. For a criticism of the neutrality approach, see Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom
Deserves More Than Neutrality, 57 FiA. L. REV. 1, 8, 37 (2005). Ledewitz repeatedly cites
the Supreme Court's attempt to recognize and accommodate religion. But this leads the
reader to question whether neutrality is indeed the proper or intended focus of the Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine. Indeed, there is much historical evidence that the constitutional
framers highly valued religion and its contribution to a constitutional democracy. See
Patrick M. Garry, The Democratic Aspect of the Establishment Clause, 59 MERCER L. REV.
595, 611 (2008). Not only did the framing generation want to ensure a continued and
strong presence of religion in society, but it wanted to make sure that nothing in the Con-
stitution inhibited such a vibrant presence in civil society. Id. at 611-17.
Winter 2013 253
254 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 51
sions failed to provide any consistent or coherent Establishment
Clause doctrine because they were out of step with public senti-
ments.' But if this be the case, then any judicial approach con-
sistent with the strict separationist approach will be unsuccessful
in resolving the Establishment Clause crisis, unless public atti-
tudes undergo a significant change.'
On one hand, if neutrality and strict separationism are the best
constitutional approaches, then why has the Court never consist-
ently followed them? On the other hand, even when the Court has
followed a separationism and neutrality approach, it has "led us
down a path of culture war and constant litigation."' And yet, alt-
hough Ledewitz argues that these principles are incorporated into
the Establishment Clause, the Court's obligation is to present to
the American people a vision of the proper relationship of religion
to public life that the people can understand and accept.o This
7. LEDEWITZ, supra note 2, at 65; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973); Ever-
son v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8. Indeed, one could argue that the confusing and contradictory course of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence began with the Court's decision in Everson. See Patrick M.
Garry, The Institutional Side ofReligious Liberty, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1155, 1174-75 (2004).
The "wall of separation" metaphor articulated in Everson led to the Lemon test in 1971,
which in turn has been used to express a kind of constitutional hostility to religion. Id. at
1176. As I have previously analyzed the wall of separation metaphor:
The "wall of separation" metaphor uses the Establishment Clause to negate the
thrust of the Free Exercise Clause. It mutes the pro-religion message of the First
Amendment. But the metaphor is appropriate only if one believes that there should
be a limit on the public presence of religion, and that religion should be primarily a
private matter, existing outside of the public square. Through this separationist ap-
proach, the courts have communicated to the American public a "categorical opposi-
tion to the intermingling of the realms of religion and politics." Mark D. Rosen, Es-
tablishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 676 (2003).
But the Everson legacy has distorted the constitutional meaning of separation. To the
extent that the First Amendment requires separation, it does so as a matter of pro-
tecting "religion from government intrusion on personal and institutional religious
autonomy." Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795,
798 (1993). The constitutional intention of a "wall of separation" was a means of pro-
tecting religion, not the secular state. Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separa-
tion of Church and State, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 307 (2002). The framers never in-
tended "to use the idea of separation to authorize discrimination against religion
within the public sphere." Paulsen, Lemon, at 810.
Not only does the "wall of separation" metaphor contradict the spirit and purpose of
the First Amendment, it provides a completely inappropriate constitutional prece-
dent or doctrine. As Justice Reed pointed out, "[a] rule of law should not be drawn
from a figure of speech." McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed,
J., dissenting).
Id. at 1177-78.
9. LEDEWITZ, supra note 2, at 44.
10. Id. at 71.
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raises the question: Is the Court to provide rules that are publicly
acceptable or ones required by an objective reading of the Consti-
tution?
III. THE POPULAR OPINION TEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
In connection with the Establishment Clause crisis, the book
undertakes a historical and intellectual analysis of secularism,
focusing on what secularism needs to do to prosper in the future.
Ledewitz argues that secularism cannot be antireligious, that it
should not be wedded to moral relativism, and that it should wel-
come and recognize religion's role in the public square." Ledewitz
also argues that a rejection of America's religious heritage may
lead to an unhealthy secularism. 2 He claims that the state should
support a deep and enriching spiritual life. But this claim is simi-
lar to an Establishment Clause model that is ardently opposed by
secularists-accommodation.
Ledewitz argues that history has little value in helping to inter-
pret the Establishment Clause, since the use of history has been
indecisive and indeterminate. 3 Here again, Ledewitz resorts to
the argument that it is not the original meaning or historical basis
of the Constitution that should determine constitutional doctrine,
but rather the people themselves.14 This is a much debated topic
among legal scholars-a wide-ranging debate between originalists
and "living" or "popular" constitutionalists.
Believing as he does in the Wall-of-Separation metaphor,
Ledewitz poses the question: "Why did such a determined begin-
ning in Everson yield so little change?"" Perhaps the reason is
that Everson never did mark the defining constitutional point that
Ledewitz claims it did. He rightly acknowledges that public un-
derstanding about the relationship of church and state is not gov-
ernment neutrality toward religion, and clearly not the Wall-of-
Separation metaphor. As Ledewitz recognizes, the Supreme Court
is not the kind of institution that can, by itself, change the funda-
mental nature of national life. But this statement seems to con-
tradict earlier ones in which he expresses surprise that the Court
in fact has not been able to do so.
11. Id. at xxii-xxiii.
12. Id. at xxii.
13. Id. at 48, 53.
14. Id. at 63.
15. Id. at 66.
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The book cites the Lochner era to illustrate another point in
time when the Court was dramatically out of step with American
attitudes and beliefs.16 Ledewitz uses the Lochner example to ar-
gue, with respect to the Establishment Clause crisis, that the obli-
gation of the Court is to present to the American people a principle
of church and state that they can accept."
IV. A HIGHER LAW THEORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Concluding that none of the existing Establishment Clause
models can bring social peace in this area, Ledewitz suggests that
the higher law model is the only one left to do the job. Ledewitz
argues that because the higher law position is not uniquely reli-
gious, government should be able to express it through the use of
religious symbols." In other words, religious symbols and expres-
sion have historically been used as a kind of shorthand for the
higher law tradition. As Ledewitz argues, "[u]sing the word 'God'
strengthens the case for higher law among a significant portion of
the citizenry."2 0 .However, this connection is just what the secular-
ists and separationists seek to avoid, arguing that the govern-
ment's use of religious symbols to express higher law constitutes
the advancement of religion through government action. Nonethe-
less, Ledewitz argues that the model will allow religious believers
to receive and entertain what they believe to be religious truths,
while nonbelievers will hear the same message and yet only see
the secular, objective messages that exist independently of any
religious message.
This higher law theory represents a genuine and serious at-
tempt to find an Establishment Clause model that can bridge the
gap between all of the various interests and beliefs. But as with
any new and far-reaching model, this one has its questionable
points. One issue, for instance, is whether government can estab-
lish higher law in the public square, and whether it can do so
through the government speech doctrine, resorting to the higher
law tradition.2'
16. Id. at 67-69; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. LEDEWITZ, supra note 2, at 44, 69-70.
18. Id. at 129.
19. Id. at 130.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 99, 109; see id. at 200-06 (further discussing the government speech doctrine).
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In connection with the higher law tradition, Ledewitz addresses
the issues of moral relativism and the existence of objective truth
or values. Although the higher law tradition is a complex subject
that can warrant an entire book in itself, the breadth of Ledewitz's
knowledge and his willingness to incorporate such diverse and
complex subjects into the book is indeed impressive.
The book tries to examine objective truth or values apart from
any strictly religious identity. For instance, Ledewitz analyzes
statements made by Pope Benedict for any transreligious mean-
ings-namely, whether those statements can be understood apart
from any religious message and in connection with the higher law
tradition.2 2 But this is where real difficulty can occur. There are
many who are not going to accept this separation. If aspects of the
higher law tradition have been historically associated with reli-
gion, there are secularists or atheists who may not be willing to
accept those "truths" apart from that historic religious association.
On the other hand, to those religious believers who may have be-
come alienated by secularists fervently denying the value or even
legitimacy of religious beliefs, there is something quite refreshing
about Ledewitz, who quotes sources ranging from the Pope, to G.
K. Chesterton, and the Gospel of St. John. In his book, Ledewitz,
as a committed and proclaimed secularist, makes a truly genuine
and determined effort to recognize and respect America's religious
identity and heritage.
As Ledewitz interestingly argues, truth is not subject to an Es-
tablishment Clause challenge, but God is. And yet, if this truth is
something that historically has been espoused as coming from
God, it is difficult to see how secularists and atheists will now ac-
cept it as truth standing on its own, apart from any association
with God, but Ledewitz earnestly tries to convince them to do so.
Moreover, many secularists and atheists argue that there is no
essential truth or objectivity-that without God, the human realm
is the ultimate authority; and since no individual is superior to
another, moral relativism must ensue.
Ledewitz acknowledges the obvious secular position that the
government's use of religious symbols is different than a simple
government endorsement of higher law.2 3 The question is whether
the use of religious language, such as the word "God," is constitu-
tional if used to endorse higher law, or whether government
22. Id. at 108, 130.
23. Id. at 120.
Winter 2013 257
Duquesne Law Review
should be permitted to use religious symbols for nonreligious pur-
poses. In this way, the higher law model might offer a new, more
simplified and more acceptable Establishment Clause test. Ulti-
mately, however, this model may end up operating much like the
current endorsement test if the courts hinge it on the perceptions
and understandings of the reasonable observer-e.g., what im-
pressions will a reasonable observer have of government's por-
trayal of religious imagery or expressions?
Ledewitz's proposed test for judging public religious expressions
is whether it is plausible to view the government's use of religious
language or symbols as endorsing the principle of higher law or
other related nonreligious themes.2 4 This test gives the benefit of
the doubt to government's use of religious imagery and to a secu-
lar purpose underlying such use. However, throughout the history
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, secularists, separation-
ists, and atheists have opposed any presumption of constitutional-
ity.
An impetus for the higher law theory comes from the recogni-
tion that there is a strong religious heritage in America.2 5 But
this recognition also seems to contradict so much of the argument
for separationism. If there is such a strong religious heritage in
America, then why shouldn't government be allowed to directly
accommodate that heritage? And yet, even though Ledewitz re-
jects an accommodationist approach, the higher law model may
essentially work toward the same goal. In other words, under the
plausibility test, government may be able to use religious imagery
as long as government officials give a plausible explanation that
the uses of that symbolism are for secular purposes. But govern-
ment officials have been arguing so for decades in Establishment
Clause cases. For instance, with respect to the Ten Command-
ments displays that have been struck down as violative of the Es-
tablishment Clause, government officials have argued that those
displays were being used only for their secular purposes; yet secu-
larists and separationists never accepted that argument, and it is
difficult to see how they would now begin doing so. Despite these
doubts, however, Ledewitz's book is a groundbreaking effort to
build an Establishment Clause bridge between accommodationists
and separationists, religious believers and secularists.
24. Id. at 134-35.
25. This heritage of the connection between religion and government in American his-
tory is discussed in Garry, Religious Freedom, supra note 6, at 15-24.
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Ledewitz agrees with the Court that Bible-reading in public
schools is unconstitutional, but then admits that something im-
portant was lost when we stopped reading the Bible in school.26
Ledewitz also states that Ten Commandments displays should not
occur in public school classrooms, even though arguing that they
may belong outside courthouses and law schools.2 7 He also goes on
to say that prayer would be a favored activity under the higher
law model, since the spiritual depth it promotes goes beyond any
one religious tradition.28 But this sounds a lot like the
nonpreferentialism model.29 Ledewitz admits that it is possible to
think of prayer as not necessarily religious at all but as a form of
meditation, and that the government is rightly concerned about
the spiritual condition of its citizens. However, if this is so, then
one might ask why the moment of silence policy in public schools
could not be upheld.
V. SECULARISM AND THE BUILDING OF A NEW PROGRESSIVE
COALITION
Chapter Eight begins a new and fascinating discussion relating
to prescriptions for saving secularism. It opens with a discussion
of how secularism has failed under the "New Atheism."30 Again,
this may be a book in itself, but Ledewitz is to be admired for in-
corporating this kind of philosophical and sociological material.
Nonetheless, this material suggests that the ultimate purpose of
this book is not so much to find some objective, enduring meaning
to the Establishment Clause, but to find a model which will save
secularism from itself and allow it to prosper.
In the following chapter, Ledewitz describes the "new new secu-
larism" and its distinction from the "New Atheism." According to
Ledewitz, the former does not reject religion as such and recogniz-
es the need for some kind of higher meaning that transcends the
26. LEDEWITZ, supra note 2, at 150.
27. Id. at 151.
28. Id. at 152, 154.
29. For a discussion of nonpreferentialism, see Garry, Religious Freedom, supra note 6,
at 39.
30. Ledewitz criticizes the reflexive anti-religious attitude of the New Atheists.
LEDEWITZ, supra note 2, at 188-89. He also recognizes that the New Atheists would cer-
tainly object to his proposal for government use of religious imagery to illustrate higher
law. Id. at 188. Given the secularist's views on the potential political and social divisive-
ness of religion, it is difficult to see how they would allow any intermingling of government
and religion. For these views on the divisiveness of religion, see Garry, Democratic Aspect,
supra note 6, at 608-10.
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individual. He wants to explore how the use by government of
religious imagery in the public square under the rubric of higher
law might actually strengthen secularism.
According to Ledewitz, the challenge to secularism is to be able
to support strong social structures and spiritual refreshment, and
he argues that the higher law model and the doctrine of govern-
ment speech are needed to help counter the extreme individualism
that has come to characterize secularism." He examines how the
use in government speech of religious symbols to express shared
meaning or substantive truth can combat this extreme individual-
ism. In his book, Ledewitz tries to move secularism to a greater
recognition of America's shared values and common culture.
Ledewitz goes a long way in reaching his Establishment Clause
model out to those who adhere to the accommodationist model.3 2
He believes in objective values and that the promotion of such
values is necessary for the survival of secularism. He also argues
that these objective values and the notion of truth they express is
something that the "new new secularism" can share with orga-
nized religion. But the question is, as Ledewitz recognizes, to
what extent can secularism be open to this kind of sharing of so-
cial space with religion--or will it simply follow a kind of reflexive
antireligious policy?
As Ledewitz explains, the "New Atheists" want to see the Estab-
lishment Clause crisis resolved not by any grand compromise or
the finding of common ground, but "by a rededication to the strict
separation of church and state and either the removal of religious-
ly oriented symbols from the public square or, at least, a ban on
any further such expressions in the future."3 ' To Ledewitz, such a
secular insistence would prevent the formation of a new progres-
sive political coalition along the lines of the New Deal coalition.3 4
And this is Ledewitz's goal-the formation of a new progressive
political coalition. But such a coalition depends, in Ledewitz's
opinion, on the acceptance of a higher law secularism in the public
square, even though it is expressed in part through religious im-
agery.
Without a higher law model, secularism could descend into a
narrow and selfish quest to satisfy one's present desires, since it
31. LEDEWITZ, supra note 2, at 204.
32. For a discussion of the accommodation doctrine, see Garry, Religious Freedom,
supra note 6, at 39-50.
33. LEDEWITZ, supra note 2, at 209.
34. Id. at 229.
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lacks an afterlife or belief system that transcends an individual
human life. The argument is that higher law secularism is open
to the values and truths that the current brand of secularism is
not, that higher secularism can transcend individualism in a way
that the current secularism cannot. Thus, higher law secularism
promises a kind of hopefulness and positive spirit that will appeal
to the public in a way that secularism never has. For this argu-
ment alone, and especially for secularists of all stripes, Ledewitz's
book deserves to be read and debated.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bruce Ledewitz has written an ambitious book that spans a
wide spectrum of subjects, from constitutional law, to judicial re-
view, to higher law philosophy, to the history of secularism. As
with all ambitious books, there are inevitable shortcomings and
deficiencies; but the first rule of writing holds that the more ambi-
tious the work, the more shortcomings it is bound to have. Not
only is Professor Ledewitz's book ambitious, but it is also creative
and constructive. It tries to find a creative solution to both a con-
stitutional and cultural problem that has long vexed an increas-
ingly divided society. Indeed, the book seeks to lay the foundation
for a revived common culture and shared identity in America."
For decades, there have been sharply divided views on the
meaning and application of the Establishment Clause and on the
very basic relationship between religion and civil society. The one
point of agreement on the part of all constitutional scholars is that
the current Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in a state of
great disarray and confusion. It is into this arena that Ledewitz
boldly steps with his intriguing and inviting new book, trying to
find some common constitutional and cultural ground.
One might criticize Ledewitz for leaving out certain bodies of le-
gal scholarship. For instance, although he discusses the concept of
strict separationism, he does not cite the extensive body of schol-
arship that questions the reliability of Thomas Jefferson's "wall of
separation" metaphor.3 6 At times, he engages in a somewhat free-
35. Id. at 206.
36. In Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and State, Daniel
Dreisbach argues that the traditional interpretation of Jefferson's "wall of separation"
metaphor is flawed because Jefferson was simply trying to express the idea that there was
a wall of separation between the federal government and religion, not between the various
state governments and religion. DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL
OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 68 (2002). Dreisbach also argues that Jeffer-
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flowing critique of the current Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, instead of a point-by-point analysis of each existing Estab-
lishment Clause model. However, an exhaustive analysis of Es-
tablishment Clause caselaw and doctrines does not appear to be
the final purpose of this book. The ultimate goal of the book
seems to be how the new secularism can help bring about and in-
spire a new progressive political movement.
In pursuing his laudable goal of attempting to find some resolu-
tion to the Establishment Clause crisis, Ledewitz addresses the
concerns of secularists and separationists, trying to bring them
into some common ground with religious believers and
accommodationists. This attempt, as has already been described,
gives this book real and lasting value, as does Ledewitz's prescrip-
tions for the future direction of secularism. Ledewitz's incorpora-
tion of the intellectual history of and current challenges facing
secularism is a valuable and unique contribution to the Estab-
lishment Clause literature.
son's wall of separation metaphor differs significantly from the way that metaphor was
used in the Everson decision. According to Dreisbach, Jefferson's notion of a wall of separa-
tion focused on separating the institutions of church and state, whereas the wall of separa-
tion metaphor in Everson sought to more expansively separate religion and all civil gov-
ernment. Id. at 125. For other works examining the historical origins of the wall of sepa-
ration metaphor, see generally, PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
(2002) and JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT:
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000). As Professor McConnell has demonstrated, in
the years leading up to adoption of the First Amendment, the colony states and Continental
Congress frequently enacted legislative accommodations to religion and that there was no
significant or expressed opposition to these practices. McConnell, supra note 4, at 693.
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